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“International Affairs is no longer the preserve of nation-states and multinational 
organizations. In an age characterized by the dispersal of power, global iz.at ion and the 
omnivorous consumption of information, public diplomacy has come into its own. Today, 
public diplomacy is neither an oxymoron nor an afterthought, hut an integral component 
for successfully conducting U.S. foreign policy. ” -Howard Cincotta, State Magazine
The terrorist attacks on September 11'*’ and the subsequent War on Terrorism 
during the fall of 2001 raised many questions within the United States about America’s 
reputation abroad. Across the country, politicians, journalists, and the public were 
looking for reasons why there was a portion of the world’s population that hated the 
United States so vehemently. Although apparent historical, political, and economic 
factors seemed hard for many Americans to accept, in the spirit of American pragmatism 
there had to be an aspect of American foreign policy and a U.S. government agency that 
could be blamed for not “selling” America well enough to the rest of the world. That 
aspect of American foreign policy was public diplomacy, and that agency was the Public 
Affairs Section of the State Department. The Public Affairs Section (PAS) is charged 
with the mission of public diplomacy which is the direct communication with foreign 
publics in the name of advancing U.S. interests. Public diplomacy as a tool of U.S. 
foreign policy came into conception at the end of World War II in response to the 
beginning of the Cold War, and the misinformation machine of the Soviet Union 
(Kirschten 1995). Although public diplomacy had widespread support in the 1950s and 
1960s, it lost funding and appeal to the general American public through the 1970s until 
Reagan became president and reinforced the importance of it as an aspect of American 
foreign policy (Lord 1998). With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, many critics of 
public diplomacy encouraged reduced funding and eventual dismembering of the United 
States government apparatus because the historical force it was made to counter was gone
and there were no major perceived threats to the U.S. (Kirschten 1995). Throughout the 
1990s, public diplomacy funding was reduced and the agency that had previously been in 
charge of the educational exchanges and the information programs- the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) was merged into the larger more bureaucratic State 
Department. The War on Terrorism brought this waning aspect of American foreign 
policy back into the news and into public discussions across the country. The House of 
Representatives held two hearings during the fall of 2001 that .sought to figure out why 
public diplomacy had seemingly failed the U.S. and how the U.S. could fix its apparatus 
(U.S. Congress 2001).
I applied to intern for the State Department during the fall of 2001 and was 
assigned to the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia. At 
first I was perplexed by this appointment because as a major in political science, with a 
focus on international and comparative politics, I had never been exposed to public 
diplomacy and the U.S. government’s public diplomacy apparatus. In our political 
science undergraduate education we were taught about international relations through the 
organization of government activity, actions of top leaders and specific historical events.
I was completely unaware of the practice of public diplomacy, yet alone the significant 
time, money and resources that the U.S. government put into communicating directly 
with foreign publics. I went to Moscow naive to the mission of the Public Affairs 
Section, and I quickly found myself with innumerable questions about what was going on 
around me, what I was working for, and what our intentions were. For much of my three 
months in Russia, I was piecing together the meaning of public diplomacy and attempting 
to swim in the bureaucratic ocean that I had been dropped into. I left the embassy with a
new understanding and perspective on American foreign policy and international 
relations, and the desire to create something tangible out of my recent experience.
This Honors senior project represents my six month exploration into the nature of 
America’s public diplomacy. Throughout the past few months, I have sought to answer 
the question; What is America’s public diplomacy? The following paper attempts to 
answer this question through an examination of the definition, history, organization, and 
programs that constitute the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus. I explored this aspect of 
American foreign policy through my on-site three month internship in the Public Affairs 
Section of the U.S. Embassy Moscow, and in three months of academic research into the 
history and issues surrounding America’s public diplomacy. While my primary exposure 
to public diplomacy was only at one embassy in one country, I am confident that the 
programs and themes I observed are replicable of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus at 
work in our embassies around the world. While interning at the embassy, I worked for all 
three of the main sections of PAS as well as shadowed their activities, attended their 
meetings, questioned participants and generally observed the people and organization that 
compose America’s public diplomacy. My project is grounded in scholarly research, yet I 
tried to include some of my personal experiences and observations as an outsider during 
my internship in PAS, because that is what I can offer to the study of public diplomacy. 1 
have come to believe that public diplomacy is a very important, yet very under valued 
and misunderstood aspect of American foreign policy. I hope this project will make the 
theory and practice of America’s current public diplomacy more understandable and 
perhaps defensible in a time when it is drawing public criticism for the areas of the world 
that remain anti-American. Although the original reason public diplomacy was embraced
3
in the U.S. has disappeared, its purpose has changed and it is just as useful in the year 
2002 as it was in 1948. To begin to explore America’s current public diplomacy it is 
imperative to understand the definition of the term “public diplomacy.”
What is Public Diplomacy?
Public diplomacy is a government’s deliberate attempt to influence strategic 
elements of foreign populations, in a way that is beneficial to’ the interests of the initiating 
government (Hansen 1989). Not just a government activity, public diplomacy is also a 
theory, strategy, and tool of foreign policy. The initiating government is attempting to 
communicate with the targeted foreign audience, specifically without the involvement of 
that population’s government. The premise is that the foreign populations, especially 
strategic elements of it, have an influence on the ruling government or will have an 
influence on future governments (Lord 1998). Making the targeted foreign population 
more tolerant or understanding of the government that initiated public diplomacy will 
ideally help the initiating government’s treatment by the foreign populations’ government 
within the traditional diplomacy realm. Often times the initiating government in public 
diplomacy, believes that the foreign population of a specific country is not getting 
accurate information about the initiating country due to a variety of reasons, including a 
government restricted speech and press, or a lack of technology and funding for 
education, and so they see it as in their best interest to provide that foreign population 
with “accurate” information (National 1996). In order to influence that foreign population 
in a way that is desirable to the government initiating the activity, the government must 
try to understand their perspective and tailor their message to that environment (Cromer 
1997). While the United States government usually approaches public diplomacy from a
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top-down effort to shape public opinion, they also strongly encourage connecting the 
American public to foreign publics because effective public diplomacy also can come 
from reciprocal person-to-person communication (Kirschten 1995).
Public diplomacy is an aspect of foreign policy that is little understood outside of 
directly involved actors including in America, ex-USIA Foreign Service officers. State 
Department officials, and a small scholarly world. Because public diplomacy is a 
relatively new term and a somewhat obscure concept to the domestic audience, it is 
necessary to differentiate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy, public affairs, 
propaganda, and misinformation. What is often studied in international relations classes 
is traditional diplomacy, official government-to-government relations between sovereign 
nation-states (Kegley 1996). While traditional diplomacy, the charge of the U.S. State 
Department is the historic cornerstone of international relations, it has begun to be 
enforced and complemented in this century by public diplomacy (U.S. Embassy 2002). 
This newer approach to international relations has developed as governments have had 
the resources to pursue two different foreign audiences; official governments and their 
people. When USIA merged into the State Department in 1998, United States 
government officials claimed that the main reason for the merger was to put public 
diplomacy at the heart of American foreign policy, and to support traditional diplomacy 
(Albright 1999). Public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy differ not only in the target 
of their engagement, but also the way that they portray America. While traditional 
diplomacy speaks with one voice of the United States government, public diplomacy 
attempts to fairly represent the differing opinions and perspectives of U.S. citizens on 
many issues (U.S.I.A. 2002). Public diplomacy is also often confused with public affairs.
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Within the American government, the term “public affairs” refers to the strategy and 
activity of distributing information about the government’s actions to the domestic 
audience, in an attempt to improve public support for government policies (U.S.I.A. 
2002). The Public Affairs Bureau of the State Department works to influence the 
American public’s knowledge of and support for American foreign policy (Department 
2002).
Within the study and practice of public diplomacy, there is widespread 
disagreement about the nature of this aspect of American foreign policy, and if it is 
essentially propaganda (Snow 1998). When the United States government first conducted 
public diplomacy programs in the 40’s, it openly defined them as propaganda, yet in the 
70’s during the Vietnam war, Americans overwhelming did not support “propagandizing 
foreigners,” and the USG changed its explanation of public diplomacy to “mutual 
understanding” (Lord 1998). The scholarly debate over if America’s public diplomacy is 
propaganda or not, continues because of the many definitions of propaganda and personal 
perceptions of U.S. cultural and informational programs. William Hachten in The World 
News Prism defines propaganda as the “systematic use of words or symbols to influence 
the attitudes or behaviors of others” (Hachten 1999, 110). Charles Kegley in American 
Foreign Policy defines propaganda as “the methodical spreading of information to 
influence public opinion” (Kegley 1996, 135). Even though the term “propaganda” has a 
negative connotation attached to it in America, the dictionary definition and both of two 
cited definitions of propaganda do apply to and define America’s current public 
diplomacy efforts. While most government officials deny that America’s public 
diplomacy is propaganda, those that do call it propaganda, emphasize that they provide
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truthful information that is not “misinformation.” Misinformation is a term coined to
describe propaganda that is untruthful and full of falsehoods as opposed to propaganda 
that is based on truth (U.S.I.A. 2002). The institutions that have carried out America’s 
public diplomacy including the United States Information Agency, the International 
Communications Agency, and the State Department have always been publicly adamant 
that they provide and portray only truthful information because if they did not, foreign 
publics would not trust them (U.S.I.A. 2002). The father of America’s modern public 
diplomacy, Edward Murrow, testified in 1963 in front of a congressional committee as 
the director of USIA; “American traditions and the American ethic requires us to be 
truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the 
worst. To be persuasive we must be believable, to be believable we must be credible, to 
be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that” (U.S.I.A. 2002).
Public diplomacy is a government strategy and activity that is practiced by most 
governments in the world, although with often contrasting approaches, different tools, 
varying levels of funding, and differing titles for the same efforts. Western democracies 
usually practice similar methods of public diplomacy including promoting cultural 
exchanges, sponsoring libraries, and funding news-based broadcasting services (Hachten 
1999). While public diplomacy efforts of non-Western countries often have the same goal 
of influencing foreign publics in their interest, they often have different methods of 
achieving their goals because of a lack of rules that bind Western public diplomacy 
apparatuses, including activities that break other countries laws, secretive programs, and 
threats against specific peoples (Hansen 1989). While the United States also utilizes 
many of these same tactics in its intelligence work, it does not employ them in its public
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diplomacy efforts. Public diplomacy apparatuses around the world have varying levels of 
funding and domestic support. During the majority of the Cold War, the USSR and the 
United States clearly spent the most amount of money attempting to influence foreign 
populations. In a 1982 speech to the Los Angles World Affairs Council, the International 
Communications Agency director Charles Wick, estimated that the Soviet Union spent 2 
billion dollars a year on “misinformation and propaganda” (Hansen 1989, 158-168). In 
the late 1970’s, while funding for public diplomacy was dropping in the United States, it 
was rising in many other countries of the world including France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and Japan (Hansen 1989, 159). In 1984, France spent 1% of their national budget 
on public diplomacy efforts while the United States spent 0.1% of its budget (Hansen 
1989, 159). Throughout the past thirty years as the communication revolution has 
affected every country and public diplomacy has been embraced as a government activity 
by modern nation-states, the United States has often been an example to interested 
countries about how to engage and influence foreign publics (Hansen 1989).
America’s public diplomacy can be defined by the missions of the two main U.S. 
government agencies that have been in charge of implementing it-USIA and the Public 
Affairs Section of the State Department. The mission of the USIA was “To understand, 
inform and influence foreign publics in the promotion of U.S. national interests and to 
broaden the dialogue between Americans, their institutions, and their counterparts 
abroad” (Ross, W 1998). This mission succinctly describes the definition of specifically 
American public diplomacy because it reveals how the agency is trying not only to 
influence foreign audiences with the interest of the U.S. in mind but also to understand 
the foreign audience, and link the foreign publics to the American public. On the current
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State Department website, the newly conceived Public Affairs Section (PAS) explains its 
mission of public diplomacy as it “complements and reinforces traditional diplomacy by 
communicating U.S. interests directly to foreign publics, including strategically placed 
individuals and institutions” (Department 2002). While there is some difference between 
the USIA definition of public diplomacy and the State Department definition, the 
fundamental similarities between the two definitions including communicating with 
foreign publics and influencing strategic elements of those populations with American 
interests in mind, reflect the themes and definition of American public diplomacy.
Public Diplomacy is defined by not only its literal definitions, but also by the 
theory behind it and its role in American foreign policy. The theory behind public 
diplomacy and its function in U.S. foreign policy have both changed overtime yet to 
accurately understand America’s current public diplomacy apparatus, it is necessary to 
understand the theories that have historically motivated public diplomacy and those that 
continue to drive it. When public diplomacy was first utilized as a tool of American 
foreign policy in the early 1950s, it was a strategic weapon in the ideological Cold War 
battle with the Soviet Union (Kirschten 1995). The U.S. like the USSR was essentially 
trying to win the “hearts and minds” of the people in the Eastern bloc and all of those in 
countries that were yet unaligned (Kirschten 1995). Public diplomacy or truthful 
propaganda was one way that the U.S. government combated the Soviet Union’s public 
diplomacy efforts and many scholars have credited the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus 
for successfully providing alternative information and ideas to people living in the 
Eastern bloc, through public diplomacy tools like the Voice of America (Lord 1998). The 
U.S. was essentially battling the Soviet Union for influence around the world and that
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goal of maintaining and having the ability to influence foreign populations is the main 
objective and theory behind public diplomacy that has lasted from its inception in 1948 to 
present day.
The main theory behind public diplomacy today is that it gives the U.S. the ability 
to influence foreign populations and all of the power that comes with that ability. Having 
the capability to maintain influence in foreign populations, in ways that are favorable to 
U.S. interests is seen as critical to the American government in continuing U.S. 
predominance in this century (National 1996). For much of history, in most areas of the 
world, the official governments of nation-states have had a monopoly on the power and 
decision making process within that state (Mathews 1997). In the past twenty years, with 
the information revolution, the spread of democracy, and a market oriented world 
economy, the power of the ruling governments has been constrained and the influence of 
non-state actors such as the media, non-governmental organizations, businesses, students, 
scholars and religious organizations have increased within many countries (Cincotta 
2000). The U.S. government has recognized that these various elements of society are 
now players in domestic politics whose opinions and actions can have international 
ramifications and the USG currently seeks to engage such actors through its public 
diplomacy apparatus.
Other theories behind the justification for public diplomacy that are also 
important include first, the idea that getting the world to understand the United States 
requires a proactive approach, and second, that if successfully implemented public 
diplomacy will encourage mutual understanding thus reducing the chance for political, 
economic, and military conflict. The first theory states that in order that the world
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community understands the positions, values and actions of the U.S., there must be a 
proactive strategy of the USG (National 1996). This idea recognizes that with increasing 
technology and the interconnectedness of the world, foreign publics often have access to 
information about the U.S. through avenues like CNN, Hollywood movies and American 
commercial products that are exported throughout the world. Current American public 
diplomacy rests on the belief that just because much of the world is exposed to some 
aspects of America, they do not have an accurate understanding of the history, culture, 
values and people that compose the U.S. (National 1996). Because foreign publics can 
not receive an accurate understanding of the U.S., it is necessary that there be a proactive, 
rather than a merely reactive program to engage those people. When public diplomacy 
began in the 1950s the goal was to win the “hearts and mind.s’’ of the world, and that goal 
has changed in the present day to merely trying to help the U.S. be accurately understood. 
Former USIA director, Joe Duffy has expressed that in his mind the current goal of 
getting the U.S. understood is far more important than getting people to like Americans 
(Kirschten 1995). The second theory, that if public diplomacy is successfully 
implemented it will reduce the chance for international conflict, can be seen even in the 
Smith-Mundt act of 1948 that established the USIA; “An act to promote the better 
understanding of the U.S. among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative 
international relations (United States 1948).” Public diplomacy seeks to strengthen its 
relations with other countries, and in the process reduce chances for conflict because the 
countries will have a better understanding of the position and values of other countries.
Public diplomacy can be and is most often defined by the tools and programs that 
compose it. There are two main aspects of America’s current public diplomacy including
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cultural and educational programs, and international information programs (Kegley 
1996). The first aspect of America’s public diplomacy consists of cultural and exchange 
programs which are trying to improve mutual understanding between the people of the 
U.S. and the world. The exchange programs encourage professional and personal 
connections between people and organizations in the U.S. and other countries (U.S.I.A 
2002). The cultural programs aim to explain and expose foreign publics to the culture, 
art, history and people of the United States. Examples of a few of the cultural and 
exchange programs of America’s public diplomacy include the Fulbright program, 
academic exchanges, English teaching, citizen exchanges, and programs for building 
democratic institutions (U.S.I.A 2002). Until 1998, when the USIA merged with the State 
Department, international broadcasting was the third primary aspect of America’s public 
diplomacy (Kirschten 1995). This aspect included the well known- Voice of America 
(VOA) and the lesser known Radio Marti, Radio Free Europe and the latest addition of 
Radio Free Asia. Since 1998, the international broadcasting aspect of public diplomacy 
has been administered by a board of directors that makes it a separate agency from the 
State Department but it still is under the ultimate control of the Secretary of State (Lord 
1998).
The second main aspect of America’s public diplomacy consists of international 
information programs (IIP), which are extremely different in theory and practice from the 
cultural and exchange programs. International information programs utilize a wide 
variety of tools to communicate America’s interest to the international audience and 
specifically strategic elements of foreign populations such as grassroots leaders, media, 
students and the business sector. The IIP programs attempt to not only influence foreign
12
populations toward U.S. interests but they also try to explain the policies of the U.S. 
government and all the intricacies and complexity of American society (Kegley 1996). 
The IIP use tools such as computers, the Internet, electronic media, publications, and 
speakers to conduct its programs. Examples of a few of the numerous information 
programs that the USG uses include recruiting American specialists in a wide range of 
fields to speak to their counterparts in other countries, digital video conferences (DVC) 
allowing international media to interview influential American leaders via the Internet, 
up-to date websites with information about the United States, and publishing books in 
multiple languages (U.S.I.A, 2002). After examining the definition, theory, and tools of 
public diplomacy, it is clear what America’s public diplomacy is composed of and what it 
is ideally striving for. To understand how these goals have come about and how they 
have changed into what currently is America’s public diplomacy, it is necessary to 
examine the history of public diplomacy in the United States.
History
America’s public diplomacy has had a relatively short yet volatile history, 
spanning the twentieth century from its very beginnings in 1917, to the present day. The 
history of public diplomacy in the United States can easily be classified into four main 
periods all related to the Cold War including it’s pre-Cold War beginnings, its 
establishment as a permanent tool of American foreign policy in the early Cold War, to 
its fluctuating position in the late Cold War and finally its transformation and perhaps 
demise in the post-Cold War period. Although their relationship to the Cold War 
connects all four of these time periods, the status, organization, and support of public 
diplomacy as a vital tool of American foreign policy differs greatly in each phase.
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Public diplomacy as a program of the USG has its roots in the pre- Cold War era 
when certain aspects of what today constitute tools of public diplomacy were first utilized 
for short periods of time. President Wilson is credited with starting to use information 
and propaganda as a tool when he established the U.S. Propaganda Office in 1917, seven 
days after the U.S. became involved in WWI (Kirschten 1995). This office was seen as 
merely part of the war effort and was consequently closed two years later in 1919. The 
next administration to utilize information and/or cultural exchanges as a foreign policy 
tool was President Roosevelt, who in 1938 created an Interdepartmental Committee for 
Scientific Cooperation, which contained a section called Cultural Cooperation (Kirschten 
1995). This section began America’s first cultural and educational programs targeting 
foreign audiences, aiming particularly to counter German influence in Latin America 
(Lord 1998). Roosevelt continued to add to the roots of the future public diplomacy 
apparatus when he created the Agency for Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda in 1941. 
In 1942, the Voice of America (VGA) was created to explain America to the world and to 
send in information to closed societies via short wave radio (Kirschten 1995). The VGA 
has been a controversial establishment because with its target audience being specific 
foreign populations, it has been accused of slanting information and preaching the ideal 
of America versus the truth about America. Heavier allegations against the VGA have 
included that it was merely “wartime propaganda and a psychological operation” (Lord 
1998). A division of the Agency for Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda called the 
Foreign Information Service was merged in 1942 into the Gffice for War Information 
(GWI), yet another office created strictly for wartime. Following the end of WWII, 
President Truman closed the GWI but he decided to keep a subunit of the GWI called the
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Public and Cultural Affairs Office and he moved it into the State Department (Kirschten 
1995). In a 1946 speech, the head of the Public and Cultural Affairs Office publicly 
defended the mission of his office as not propaganda but “dignified information 
programs” (Kirschten 1995). This marked the first of a long line of debates within the 
United States of if the USG was propagandizing with these offices or merely telling the 
truth. Public criticism of public diplomacy came with the first few United States 
government activities that were trying to influence foreign populations in strategic ways. 
Most criticism of public diplomacy and accusations of its propaganda-nature came from 
the academic world, instead of the government itself. Even to this day, controversy still 
surrounds public diplomacy in the academic realm and in international politics. The pre- 
Cold war era was interesting for public diplomacy because it produced the roots of later 
public diplomacy programs yet the idea of continuing these information and educational 
activities as non-war efforts never seemed to stick with the United States government in 
this time period.
The early Cold War period (1946-65) marked the acceptance of American public 
diplomacy as a permanent and necessary tool of foreign policy, now with an official 
home in the United States Information Agency (USIA). This new position of public 
diplomacy was partially due to the United States Information and Educational Exchange 
Act of 1948 (1948 Smith-Mundt Act), which established that the U.S. needed to improve 
its relations among the world population and it created the USIA with a focus on 
educational exchanges (United States 1948). Even though the act was passed in 1948, it 
was not until 1953 under President Eisenhower that USIA was a fully functioning 
agency. Because it was created at the end of the Korean War, the mission of USIA in its
15
infancy was to combat international communism (Kirschten 1995). McCarthyism and 
anticommunism plagued the United States during this time, aiding the United States 
government to find targets both in America and abroad who could be blamed for 
communism. The American attitude “of do something about it,” encouraged the success 
of programs like public diplomacy activities because they fought on the side of the 
“American people” against the communists. Also in the early 1950’s, Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Free Liberty, two more avenues for broadcasting over the short wave radio 
were created to intentionally send in international news and differing opinions from the 
state- controlled media in communist Europe and the Soviet Union (Lord 1998). In 1965, 
the term “public diplomacy” was first used by Dean Guillon of Tufts University, yet his 
phrase would not be embraced by the government or public for years to come (Hansen 
1989, 3). Unlike during any other time period in American history, in the early Cold War 
years public diplomacy was widely embraced by the government and public as an activity 
that was necessary and very important to the goals of American foreign policy. When 
President Kennedy chose famed WWII journalist Edward Murrow as the head of the 
USIA, he further contributed to the widespread American public support of the mission 
of public diplomacy and the agency of the USIA (Powers 1999). The early Cold War 
period was important for the path of American public diplomacy not only because it was 
first embraced as a permanent tool of foreign policy but it also because this was the time 
when the goals, mission, and perspectives of the USG public diplomacy apparatus were 
fundamentally defined. It’s foundation from the early Cold War period has directed the 
path of American public diplomacy for the past fifty years and now is haunting the 
apparatus in the twenty first century as it is trying to redefine its mission and purpose.
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The late Cold War period (1965-1991) challenged the foundations and success of 
American public diplomacy that had been established in the early Cold War period, as the 
Executive administration and public support for public diplomacy fluctuated widely 
ranging from the disregard by President Nixon to avid support by “the great 
communicator’’ President Reagan (Lord 1998). The fluctuating and sometimes 
unpredictable levels of public and presidential support during this time, affected the 
prestige, resources and future of American public diplomacy. The turning point in this 
time period was the Vietnam War, which challenged the assumptions of the political elite 
as well as the public’s support of the government and their activities of “propagandizing” 
foreigners (Lord 1998). The American people began to di.strust their government and 
public diplomacy simultaneously entered a long period of decline until Reagan came to 
the presidency (Powers 1999). President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger are 
notorious for their geopolitical worldview and communicating directly with foreign 
publics did not fit into this method of international politics, so during their administration 
public diplomacy was almost totally ignored (Lord 1998). Partly in response to the lack 
of interest in public diplomacy by Nixon, when Carter became president he paid attention 
to this aspect of foreign policy and he reorganized the public diplomacy apparatus (Lord 
1998). Carter named the USIA the International Communications Agency (ICA) in an 
attempt to distance it from its public image as an aspect of American foreign policy and 
he transferred educational exchanges from the State Department to the ICA (Kinschten 
1995). Even though Carter brought back attention to public diplomacy by his interest in it 
and his reorganization, public support of it still waned and many scholars have accused 
Carter of doing little more for public diplomacy then reshuffling the bureaucracy
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(Kirschten 1995). In 1980, Radio Marti was created as a replica of Radio Europe, to 
target Cuba’s communist regime and to provide the Cuban people with international 
information and the positions of the U.S. (Kirschten 1995). Near the end of the Cold War, 
Reagan came to the presidency and supported and reinvigorated public diplomacy to a 
level that the White House had not seen since President Roosevelt (Powers 1999).
Reagan attempted to refocus public diplomacy efforts with strategic interests in mind and 
he changed the name of the USG public diplomacy agency back to USIA and changed 
the drive of the USIA to reinforcing the legitimacy of democracy, under the strong 
leadership of USIA head Charles Wick (Lord 1998). As the late Cold War period ended 
in 1991 when the Soviet Union fell, public diplomacy programs like the Voice of 
America were credited with contributing to the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the eastern 
bloc (Lord 1998). Despite the successes of public diplomacy programs during the Cold 
War, after 1991 American support for public diplomacy plummeted and its future was 
uncertain.
The post Cold War period (1991-present) continued the fluctuating levels of 
support for public diplomacy that characterized the late Cold War but it brought new 
questions of the rationale, demand, logic and need for American public diplomacy in a 
non bi-polar world. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many Americans argued that 
without a strong ideological battle, the need to inform foreign publics of the U.S. 
perspective had disappeared (Kinzer 2(X)1). There was no longer an urgency to speak to 
the common people of the world to counter a threat to the U.S. so the increasing public 
diplomacy monetary resources and personnel of the Reagan presidency were abruptly 
stopped (Cromer 1997). In the early 1990’s, President Bush decided to eliminate Radio
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Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty at the same time that the Voice of America was in a 
slump with a smaller budget and less USG support (Lord 1998). During the Clinton 
presidency, public diplomacy continued to decline in support although he did change a 
few aspects of their programs (Powers 1999). Clinton established an International 
Broadcasting Bureau when he signed the International Broadcasting Act in 1993, which 
consolidated the various broadcasting organizations (Hachten 1999). In 1994, Clinton 
also began Radio Free Asia targeting China, Tibet, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam. Laos, 
and North Korea (Hachten 1999). During the Clinton administration, the budget of public 
diplomacy was drastically cut, which reduced not only the programs of the USIA but al.so 
the staff.
A major event affecting the path of American public diplomacy in the post Cold 
War period was the 1998 merger between USIA and the State Department. This merger 
was directly the result of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 and 
indirectly the result of political disagreements in Washington about the status and future 
of public diplomacy. The official sound bite of the State Department was that the merger 
was intended to put public diplomacy at the heart of America’s foreign policy and to 
increase the harmony of the message that the USG was sending to foreign governments 
and foreign publics (Rubin 1999; Albright 1999). Not only did the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act merge the USIA into State but it also took out and 
separated the broadcasting aspect of public diplomacy by creating a Board of 
Broadcasting that is independent of the State Department. The current Bush 
administration has attempted to give a fresh image to the new public diplomacy apparatus 
of the Public Affairs Section of State by controversially choosing a successful advertising
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executive named Charlotte Beers to head the Public Affairs Section (Munro 2001). The
controversy of Beer’s nomination stems from the idea that America is not a product to be 
sold to the world, like Beer’s past accomplishments selling Uncle Ben’s rice bowls and 
toilet paper (Battle 2001). The choice of a private sector advertiser also continues the 
American political debate about if parts of government would be better run by private 
sector trained executives or government trained officials. Secretary of State Powell has 
defended the unprecedented choice of an advertiser to head America’s public diplomacy 
by arguing that the United States has to sell its message better to the world and who is 
more qualified to do that, than a successful private sector advertiser. The September 11, 
2001 terrorists’ attacks and the subsequent War on Terrorism have brought public 
diplomacy back into the national spotlight as the government, the media and the public 
have reevaluated the apparatus and its mission. Because of the hostilities toward the U.S. 
in many areas of the world, Americans wanted to know why America’s public diplomacy 
was seemingly not working, and there were calls to put more money and resources into 
the section of the USG that sells America’s culture, society, government and perspectives 
to the world (U.S. Congress 2001). The post Cold War period has been very interesting 
for the study of public diplomacy because it has included polar opposite trends from the 
1991 cry that public diplomacy was not needed anymore, through ten years of budget 
cuts and waning prestige, to 2001 when suddenly some of the effects of reduced public 
diplomacy in Central Asia and the Middle East were felt and there were cries across the 
nation for more public diplomacy funding and programs.
Although the history of American public diplomacy has been relatively short, it 
has been filled by drastically different levels of public and governmental support, various
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ideas of what the mission and purpose of public diplomacy should be and different ideas 
of what kind of programs best communicate with foreign publics. The history of 
American public diplomacy reveals that the future of public diplomacy has always been 
uncertain and in short periods of time and because of specific events, support for it can 
rise and drop at astonishing rates. History has also shown that the organization and 
programs of America’s public diplomacy apparatus have changed multiple times 
throughout the past century. Understanding America’s current public diplomacy requires 
an introduction to the State Department’s organization and numerous Public Affairs 
Section programs.
Organization and Programs: State Department & PAS Moscow
The Department of State is the federal agency that is currently charged with the 
mission of organizing and implementing America’s public diplomacy. For most of the 
history of public diplomacy, it has been carried out by the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), an agency that was considered semi-autonomous from the State 
Department yet ultimately it had to answer to the Secretary of State. USIA was divided 
into four bureaus including the Bureau of Information, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, International Broadcasting Bureau, and the Bureau of Management 
(Ross 1998). Since 1998 when USIA merged into the State Department, most of the 
programs and goals of USIA were transferred to the newly conceived Public Diplomacy 
& Public Affairs Bureau. This bureau is one of the six main bureaus of State and is 
currently led by undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers 
(Department 2002). The Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau has two main 
missions and is divided into three major sections including Educational and Cultural
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Affairs (ECA), International Information Programs (IIP) and Public Affairs (PA). The 
former two sections have the mission of public diplomacy, informing foreign audiences, 
while the latter section has the sole mission of informing the American public of 
international relations and American foreign policy (Department 2002).
When USIA was established in the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, stipulations in the act 
clearly called for two different sources of information for foreign publics and the 
domestic American audience (United States 1948). This distinction calls into question the 
original intent of America’s public diplomacy in the 1940’s. If public diplomacy was 
going to be truthful in the beginning, why was there a need for two different sets of 
information, one for Americans and one for the rest of the world? The two separate 
sources of information are rarely mentioned in scholarly writing about the USG’s public 
diplomacy apparatus, leading to the conclusion that perhaps the American people do not 
know that the American government deliberately provides different information to them 
and foreign populations. When the State Department took over the activities of USIA, 
they maintained the distinction between information organized for the American public 
and that for the foreign public, with the argument that each audience had different 
informational interests. The difference between public diplomacy (information for 
foreign publics) and public affairs (information for American audiences) becomes 
organizationally confusing in the State Department because they call the public 
diplomacy activities and programs at U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad. Public 
Affairs Sections (PAS). Despite the title Public Affairs Section, these sections have 
nothing to do with an American audience and everything to do with information for 
foreign audiences.
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The Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is identical in 
organization to PAS’s at U.S. embassies around the world, although in size it is 
significantly different from other PAS’s. Despite the size difference, PAS Moscow is an 
appropriate case study for an examination of America’s public diplomacy because its 
similarities and differences with other PAS’s reveal the basic organization and current 
conditions of this foreign policy apparatus. PAS Moscow is similar to all Public Affairs 
Sections in that the same United States government public diplomacy theory drives all 
programs, most PAS’s have the same cultural and information programs, and the same 
Foreign Service Officers rotate between the embassies. All American embassies and 
PAS’s specifically, had to deal with the ramifications of September 11“’ and the War on 
terrorism during the fall of 2001. While some embassies close to Central Asia had to 
drastically change their activities to support the War on Terrorism, other PAS’s like PAS 
Moscow continued with their regular activities, while tailoring some of them to the War 
on Terrorism. The funding and subsequent size of U.S. embassies around the world is 
based on the historical and current relationship between that country and the United 
States, and its value in our foreign policy. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is particularly 
large in funding and personnel because of the importance and value of Russia in 
historical and modern American foreign policy. The main reason why PAS Moscow is 
different from other PAS’s is its immense size of personnel and resources for programs. 
PAS Moscow has 51 employees, out of which 13 are American Foreign Service Officers. 
In most U.S. Embassy’s there are a maximum of three PAS Foreign Service Officers 
including the Public Affairs Officer, the Cultural Attache, and the Press Attache. While 
most PAS’s are funded by base funding which is generated yearly by Congress to the
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State Department’s Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and International 
Information Programs (IIP), half of PAS Moscow is currently funded by the Freedom 
Support Act. The Freedom Support Act was started by Congress in 1991 to provide 
additional resources for developing and supporting the Newly Independent States (U.S. 
Department 2001). During FY 2000, U.S. government programs in Russia received $168 
million dollars from the Freedom Support Act, with public diplomacy programs 
accounting for $25 million dollars of that budget (U.S. Department 2001). Since 
receiving millions of dollars yearly from the Freedom Support Act, Moscow PAS has 
blossomed in personnel and programs. Despite the immense size difference in personnel 
and number of programs, the common features shared by all Public Affairs Sections 
make it possible to examine PAS Moscow and to draw inferences about what constitutes 
America’s current public diplomacy apparatus.
Public Affairs Sections (PAS) at U.S. embassies around the world are composed 
of three main divisions including the Cultural, Press and Information Resource Sections. 
While America’s public diplomacy is often created and organized by the Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (ECA) and International Information Programs (IIP) at State 
headquarters in Washington D.C., the programs are implemented and given life in the 
Cultural (mostly ECA programs). Press (mostly IPP programs) and Information Resource 
(usually IIP programs) Sections of U.S. embassies across the globe. The real work of 
public diplomacy occurs in these three sections, as Foreign Service Officers and Foreign 
Service Nationals communicate directly with foreign publics in implementing a diverse 
range of programs. I worked for all three sections in PAS Moscow, which allowed me to 
be exposed to the daily operations, programs, and participants of the breadth of
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America’s public diplomacy. My internship coincided with the beginning of the War on 
Terrorism, so I was also able to observe how the Cultural, Press, and Information 
Resource Sections channeled information about the war into their regular programs. 
While PAS Moscow created a few new activities to influence the Russian’s public 
perception of the USG position, they did utilize many of their existing public diplomacy 
avenues to explain and defend USG activity in Afghanistan. Some of these programs will 
be explained in the following sections with close-ups of specific Cultural, Press and 
Information Resource Section activities. Perhaps more than any other aspects of public 
diplomacy including its definition, theory, and history, the programs that constitute it, are 
what really define and explain America’s current public diplomacy. Because PAS 
programs are the heart of communicating with foreign publics, it is necessary to examine 
them more in-depth and to look at their mission, the span of programs, close-up’s on a 
few programs, and my impressions within each section.
CULTURAL SECTION
The largest section of PAS Moscow is the Cultural Section which is charged with 
the mission of increasing mutual understanding between Americans and the Russian 
public. The Cultural Section aims broadly to widen Russian understanding and 
appreciation of the U.S. as a country with an emphasis on recognizing its political 
process, culture, values and diversity. The long term theory behind the goals and 
programs of the Cultural Section is to improve the bilateral relationship between Russia 
and the U.S. and to encourage Russian openness to American ideas and actions. PAS 
Moscow utilizes two main avenues in pursuit of its mission of mutual understanding 
including encouraging connections through individuals, groups of people and businesses
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between both countries, and by exposing Russians to American culture including its 
history, art and traditions (U.S.I.A 2002). Unlike the other sections of PAS, the Cultural 
Section usually partakes in programs and activities that have long term goals and 
unquantifiable results. Most programs of the Cultural Sections in PAS’s in U.S. 
embassies around the world are organized by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs (ECA) which is one of the three main bureaus within the Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs Bureau.
Of all three of the sections of PAS Moscow, the Cultural Section organizes and 
implements the most numerous and wide-ranging set of programs. Upon arriving at the 
embassy, I was overwhelmed by the numerous programs that the Cultural Section 
monitored and implemented. It took me weeks to separate what programs were designed 
for whom, and I eventually concluded that there are two general types of programs 
including exchanges and cultural education programs, targeting four main audiences: 
students, teachers, businesspeople, and leaders. The first type of program that the Cultural 
Section implements are academic and professional development exchange programs. 
Since 1993, the U.S. government through all of its departments has sent 44,500 Russians 
to America on long-term academic exchanges or short-term professional exchanges (U.S. 
Department of State 2(X)1). During the FY 2000, 2,700 Russians went on PAS Moscow 
exchanges consisting of 900 Russian citizens on academic exchanges and 1,600 Russian 
citizens on professional exchanges (U.S. Department of State 2001). Examples of 
academic exchanges organized and implemented by the Cultural Section include famous 
programs like the Fulbright Graduate and Senior Scholar program and many not-so 
famous academic exchanges like The Freedom Support Act Undergraduate Exchange
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Program, The Freedom Support Act Secondary School Exchange Program, Future 
Leaders Exchange Program, Contemporary Issues Fellowship Program, Regional Scholar 
Exchange Program, Junior Faculty Development Program and Partners in Education 
(U.S.I.A 2002). Unlike academic exchanges which target secondary, undergraduate, 
graduate students and faculty at different stages of their careers, professional exchange 
programs target mid to end career professionals in a wide range of professions. Examples 
of professional development exchanges run by the Cultural Section include the 
International Visitor Program, Special Regional Leaders Program, NATO tours. 
Parliamentary Exchange Programs, Open World Russian Leadership Program, and 
Community Connections Programs which consist of Business for Russia, Community 
Connections Professionals, Presidential Management Training Initiative, and the 
Productivity Enhancement Program (U.S.I.A 2002).
The second type of general program that the Cultural Section runs besides 
exchanges are cultural education programs which consist of many different kinds of 
activities, with a diverse range of goals. Examples of cultural education programs include 
the Democracy Commission, Regional Initiatives, U.S. Speakers and Specialists, Book 
Translation and Publication Program, Educational Information Centers, Internet Access 
and Training Programs, English language Office, EFL Fellow Program and art and 
cultural exhibits (U.S.I.A 2002). These various programs are the heart of America’s 
public diplomacy. It is, however, impossible to explain all of the programs and their goals 
here due to the plethora of programs and the desire to keep this project in the paper and 
not book format. Because the basic mission of the Cultural Section is to improve mutual 
understanding between Russia and the U.S., the following section will examine three
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programs particularly geared toward this end, including the International Visitors 
Program which sends Russian citizens to the U.S., the Democracy commission which 
focuses on improving Russia’s social infrastructure through local energy and direction, 
and the English Language Fellow Program which sends American specialists to Russia. 
Close-up: International Visitors Program
One of the largest of the professional exchange programs administered by PAS 
Moscow is the International Visitor Program (IV). Funded by both the Freedom Support 
Act and base funding, the IV program has sent over 1,500 Russians since its beginning in 
1991 to the United States (U.S. Department of State 2001). The IV program sends 
Russian professionals in the middle to end of their career to the United States for one to 
three weeks on specific themed programs relating to their professional field. Examples of 
program themes include democratic and economic reform, defense and foreign policy 
making, rule of law, education, freedom of religion, taxation and budget, health care, and 
art management. Participants in the IV program are sent to cities across the U.S. 
depending on their program theme where they are introduced to their American 
professional counterparts. The participants are nominated by U.S. embassies and 
consulates and are usually recommended through local contacts and non-governmental 
organizations. Although most IV participants are mid-career Russian professionals in 
many different fields, the program has also sent high level Russian government officials 
including in 2000, eight Duma members who met in Washington D.C. with U.S.
Congress members to discuss nuclear waste management (U.S. Department of State 
2001). Although the IV program is a typical public diplomacy program administered at 
U.S. embassies around the world since the 1950s, it only began at the U.S. Embassy
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Moscow in 1991. The IV program has gotten larger each year and in FY 2000, it sent 400 
Russians to the U.S. Since the program has been administered by PAS Moscow, it has 
cost the United States government over $15 million dollars (U.S. Department of State 
2001).
Although there are many professional exchange programs administered by the 
Cultural Section, the International Visitor’s program is a good example of the typical 
exchange program because it is administered widely at U.S. embassies, it has a common 
organizational structure, is theme based, and participants are chosen by similar criteria. 
Unlike some of the exchange programs utilized by the Cultural Section that are 
specifically for the Newly Independent States, the IV program is a typical Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) program that is implemented by most Public 
Affairs Sections at U.S. embassies around the world. The IV program is also organized 
similar to most other exchange programs because it is funded by the USG, monitored by 
the PAS, participants are chosen by the Cultural Section and partner NGO’s and 
American institutions in the states do all of the planning and logistic work for the 
programs to succeed. The one to three week duration of the IV program is also typical of 
the length of time for all of the professional exchange programs. A typical characteristic 
of exchange programs is that they are theme based, usually relating to classic American 
attributes including democratic political system, citizenship, rule of law, freedom of 
religion and media, and business. Participants for USG exchange programs are chosen in 
merit-based competitions, with reference to the applicant’s home-town region and 
professional. PAS Moscow has been trying to intentionally seek out participants from all 
of the regions of Russia especially eastern Russia, where citizens do not have the same
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resources as Muscovites. Overall the IV program like all exchange programs, is trying to 
expose Russians to American business and social ideas that they can use as their country 
is rapidly developing.
Close-up: Democracy Commission
While the majority of the programs that the Cultural Section implements are 
exchange programs similar to the International Visitor program, they also have some 
programs that focus directly on Russian institutions and organizations that are helping to 
strengthen Russian social and economic infrastructure. An example of this kind of 
support program is the Democracy Commission, which is funded by the Freedom 
Support Act. The Democracy Commission is a commission organized by PAS Moscow, 
but composed of representatives from the Political, Economic, Public Affairs, Science 
and Technology, and USAID sections of the embassy, that awards grants to grassroots 
Russian NGO’s working to improve Russian democracy and civil society. The 
Commission reviews proposals of groups that need financial support to get a program or 
organization started with the requirement that they will be self-sustainable in the long 
term and will continue to work to improve civic education, human rights advocacy, 
volunteerism, environmentalism, free flow of information or public policy. The 
Commission tries to sponsor democracy-building organizations that are not supported by 
any other large NGO’s, private foundations or the Russian government. The most 
financial support that any one grant will receive is $24,000 and in FY2000, 17 grants 
were awarded costing the USG over $150,000 (U.S. Department of State 2001). The 
Democracy Commission began in U.S. Embassy Moscow in 1998 and has sponsored 
over thirty-two grants at a total cost of $500,000 (U.S. Department of State 2001).
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I observed the December meeting of the Democracy Commission, which exposed 
me to the procedural and practical aspect of this type of public diplomacy program. Ten 
commission members from five embassy sections attended the meeting and reviewed 
seven proposals from Russian grassroots organizations. The meeting began with a 
discussion about what to do with proposals that are poorly written and unintelligible. The 
debate became heated as some members thought that the mission of the Democracy 
Commission was to provide assistance to organizations that needed it and most likely 
those organizations would not have experience with writing professional proposals. Other 
members felt if the group had not taken the time to think about what they were proposing, 
they shouldn’t be considered for a grant. The debate ended with agreement that the 
director of the commission would filter through the applicants and make her own 
decision. The proposals that are being examined and voted on during a particular 
Democracy Commission meeting are sent beforehand to the members so they can review 
the proposal before discussing it with the commission. In December, the board reviewed 
seven proposals asking for funding from around Russia, which ranged from setting up 
women’s crisis centers, to inter-ethnic tolerance programs, to purchasing a bus for a 
roaming youth program. The main interests of the commission members when reviewing 
proposals was to make sure that the grassroots organizations and the specific project 
being proposed were not funded by any other government or organization. That the USG 
was not assisting any particular individual or organization multiple times, was also a 
common concern of most PAS projects. There are many requirements about how the 
grant money from Washington DC could be spent by an organization, including that it 
can not go to pay salaries and it must be spent in a way that makes a program self-
31
sustainable after the initial grant is spent. Much of the commission discussion centered on 
if the requested money would be spent at the right places and if the project would really 
be self-sustaining afterwards. After each proposal was discussed, the Democracy 
Commission voted on the proposal and as in a truly democratic nature, the majority won. 
Three of the seven proposals were approved during the December meeting and the 
decision to approve a proposal or not was almost always unanimous.
Although the Democracy Commission is a relatively small and cheap program, it 
is a rare opportunity for grassroots Russian organizations to directly petition the 
American Embassy for money and reciprocally, an opportunity for the USG to directly 
assist local groups who are forgotten by other institutions, and help them essentially help 
themselves. The Democracy Commission is challenging and teaching Russian 
organizations not only how to write grant proposals, but how to make programs that are 
self-sustainable and will not continually rely on hand outs of money from a government. 
This program is also a classic example of how American public diplomacy aims to spread 
information about the attributes of successful democracies including protecting human 
rights, freedom of religion, an independent media, involved citizenship, and creating 
grassroots organizations and interest groups.
Close-up: English Language Office
Another important example of the types of activities and programs that the 
Cultural Section implements is the English Language Office (ELO) and its English as a 
Foreign Language (EFL) Fellow program. The mission of the Cultural Section of 
improving mutual understanding between Russians and Americans is supported by the 
English Language Office which seeks to further engage Russians through increasing
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English language competence. The ELO encourages learning English as a foreign 
language throughout Russia by organizing teaching activities, creating educational 
programs and materials. The ELO works at its mission with the Russian Ministry of 
Education, non-governmental organizations, Russian English as a Foreign Language 
professionals, and Peace Corps Russia. Most of their activities focus on developing 
English language teaching materials and professionals, teaching business English and 
American studies. The ELO also ships subsidized (usually costing Russians one dollar 
per book) English language materials across Russia on request to schools and institutions. 
The ELO also funds an English as a Foreign Language Fellow training program where 
American specialists in teaching English as a Second Language (TESL) and applied 
linguistics live in Russia for one year and work with Russian professionals and teachers 
on curriculum, material development and TESL methodology. In 2001, there were ten 
ESL fellows at institutions of higher education around various regions in Russia. Since 
the EFL Fellow program began in 1994, there have been over forty ESL fellows at a cost 
of over five million dollars (U.S. Department of State 2001).
I interviewed a Foreign Service Officer connected to the English Language Office 
while I was in Moscow and I was surprised by her impressions of teaching English as an 
aspect of public diplomacy and bilateral relations. I had worked for the English Language 
Office throughout my internship and it appeared to me like the only section that did not 
fit into the Public Affairs Section mission of public diplomacy. How did teaching English 
help to explain and defend the positions of the United States government? I asked a 
Foreign Service Officer who worked with the ELO to explain to me how teaching 
English fit into America’s current public diplomacy apparatus and the bilateral
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relationship between Russia and the United States. She saw English as a language that 
would help the Russians enter the world community, improve the Russian-American 
bilateral relationship, and encourage economic development (Anonymous 2001). Because 
most global conferences are dominated by English and most books are printed in English, 
becoming proficient in English will ideally help Russians become involved in 
international affairs. In the view of the USG encouraging Russians to learn English is an 
asset to the Russian-American bilateral relationship because learning another language 
often encourages the learner to be more understanding of that country (Anonymous 
2001). She explained that her office was not only trying to encourage teaching English as 
a second language but they were mostly concerned with improving the quality of the 
English teaching that was already occurring (Anonymous 2(X)1). There are only ELO at 
twenty posts worldwide and they only visit communities and schools in that country that 
specifically invite them.
The Cultural Section’s mission of improving mutual understanding is carried out 
by the English Language Office’s EEL Fellow Program where American experts in 
Teaching English learn about Russians by living in Russia for one year. While the 
majority of the Cultural Section’s exchange programs send Russians to the United States, 
some programs like this one, send Americans to Russia. The EFL Fellow program has 
many characteristics that are similar to other specialists programs run by PAS where 
American specialists with a minimum of a Master’s degree travel to another country to 
teach local professionals or schools their craft. Not only do the Russians in the 
communities where the Fellows live benefit from their year stay, but the Americans also 
learn significantly about Russia.
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Impressions of the Cultural Section
Through my participation and work in many different activities and meetings of 
the Cultural Section, certain aspects of influencing foreign publics struck me as key 
features of America’s public diplomacy. Exchange and cultural programs target very 
specific audiences including professionals in many fields and young leaders. I was very 
surprised that the targeted audience was not just political leaders but leaders in a diverse 
range of fields from health care to education. Clearly such broad training in many 
occupations is a way that the USG makes public diplomacy programs appear non­
threatening to foreign governments, but it also encourages positive development across a 
countries entire infrastructure, not just political system. America’s public diplomacy not 
only targets specific audiences but it is seems to be very theme based and the themes are 
very “American” ideas and values. It became very clear to me over my internship that 
America’s public diplomacy especially in the Cultural Section depends on cooperation 
with NGO’s and separate institutions. More often than not it appeared as though the USG 
funded programs and therefore had the right to monitor NGO’s who did all of the logistic 
and planning work behind the exchanges. This is a very interesting relationship because 
the USG was able to be involved in more programs, with fewer personnel and they could 
attach their name to more programs with little work. I was intrigued by the wide range of 
programs that the Cultural Section implements from the Fulbright Program, to the 
professional exchanges, to the Democracy Commission, to cultural exhibits. The diverse 
range of programs reveals that there are many ways to attempt to influence foreign 
populations and the USG is currently utilizing many of them.
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PRESS SECTION
The Press Section is charged with the mission of explaining and defending U.S. 
policies and activities to foreign publics. Being able to explain America’s political and 
economic interests to a target foreign audience at a critical time and in an effective 
manner is seen by the United States government as essential to solving transnational 
problems and fundamental to maintaining positive bilateral relations. The mission of the 
Press Section of communicating America’s interests directly to foreign populations is a 
major aspect of America’s current public diplomacy. Unlike the Cultural Section, where 
their work is mostly on organizing and implementing programs, the Press Section work is 
policy oriented as it helps to create and enforce State Department policy, as well as it is a 
resource for the Russian media and the American government. The Press Section does 
organize some programs for media assistance but they are not a large percentage of the 
sections activities. The Press Section utilizes resources and guidance from the 
International Information Programs (IIP) Section of the Public Affairs and Public 
Diplomacy bureau.
In carrying out its mission of explaining and defending U.S. policies, the Press 
Section is responsible for three main kinds of activities including first, being press 
support for the embassy, the Ambassador, and visiting senior officials, second, 
monitoring and analyzing local public opinion, and third, assisting the host country 
media. The first task of being press support for the embassy requires the Press Section to 
handle all questions from the Russian media and public about American foreign policy, 
usually pertaining to the host country. The Press Section works closely with the local 
media by not only answering que.stions but putting opinion editorial articles by U.S.
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government officials in local print media and electronic media and by maintaining regular 
relations with the local journalists. The Press Section and especially the Press Attache 
work regularly with Russian journalists, editors and the Russian Ministry of Information. 
The Press Section assists the Russian media by offering opportunities to interview U.S. 
government officials through WorldNet, digital video conferences, and television 
program production. Besides being press support for the embassy as a whole, the Press 
Section is also press support specifically for the ambassador and other high level embassy 
officers. The Press Section organizes press conferences, public appearance, and 
interviews for the ambassador as well as writes his speeches. On a less regular basis, the 
Press Section offers press support for senior United States government visiting officials 
such as the President or the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet members. During such 
visits, the Press Attache is the main point of contact for the local media and assists the 
American journalists who travel with the visitor.
The second main activity of the Press Section is to monitor and analyze local 
public opinion and media. Within the Press Section of Moscow PAS there are several 
people who spend the majority of their time following coverage of U.S. activities in the 
print media and electronic media. Not only does the Press Section report on host country 
public opinion but they develop activities and programs to influence that public opinion 
in a way desirable to U.S. interests. The Press Section keeps the ambassador and 
appropriate officials at the Department of State abreast of Russian public opinion and 
reactions to international events. The third main task of the Press section is to organize 
programs that assist the local media. Examples of such programs in the past few years 
include an internship program for media managers, an International Visitors program for
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journalists, a small grants program helping independent television series, and Thematic 
Reporting Tours bringing Russian journalists to the U.S. to meet with the their 
counterparts on specific themes.
The Press Section explains and defends American policies to foreign publics 
through many different avenues including as the following close-up’s demonstrate, by 
means of the media and directly to the target population. The following section will 
examine a digital video conference (DVC) with Ambassador Pifer, and Ambassador 
Vershbow’s speech to Moscow State University, as examples of the Press Section’s 
regular public diplomacy efforts. While both of these examples, a DVC and a speech by 
the ambassador, are regular public diplomacy tools utilized by Moscow PAS these close- 
up’s show how current USG opinion and activity like the War on Terrorism can be 
communicated to the host country through PAS programs.
Close-up: DVC with Ambassador Pifer
On October 10,2001, the Press Section organized a digital video conference 
(DVC) question and answer session between Ambassador Pifer in Washington DC and 
eight Russian journalists at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Digital video conferences are 
meetings held through electronic equipment as two different audiences in separate 
locations can speak and listen to each other over a digital computer. These teleconference 
programs are tools developed by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) 
that have only recently been used by Press Sections at embassies around the world. This 
equipment can be used in many ways but it is usually utilized to allow host country 
journalists to interview high level U.S. government officials who can not easily travel to 
that country. This kind of technology puts Russian journalists in contact with key
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officials in the U.S. government who they would not otherwise be able to interact with. 
The DVC’s organized by the Moscow Press Section usually relate to current events in 
America or the international community.
The DVC that I attended on the tenth of October was generally about the subject 
of terrorism and specifically the perspective of the United States Government on its 
actions post September 11'*^. Ambassador Pifer explained the War on Terrorism and the 
most recent foreign policy decisions of the USG before the journalists began to ask him 
questions. There were eight journalists from major Russian newspapers at the conference, 
all individually invited by the Press Section. Ambassador Pifer does not speak Russian 
and the journalists did not all speak English so there were translators at both ends of the 
conference to interpret for both audiences. The double translation slowed the pace of the 
meeting down but both sides were heavily engaged in the electronic interaction. The 
Russian journalists asked Ambassador Pifer many questions ranging from “what were the 
motives of the September 11'*’ terrorists?” to “will the U.S. bomb Iraq soon?” While 
Ambassador Pifer attempted to keep the conversation on terrorism, two of the Russian 
journalists were pressing him for answers about how the United States was handling Iraq 
and if we had any plans to attack Iraq soon. Ambassador Pifer gave the standard USG 
canned answers to all of the journalist’s questions which seemed to frustrate some of the 
journalists who appeared to be looking for more interesting information. Ambassador 
Pifer was a very smooth speaker who was clearly very knowledgeable about the USG 
position as he was able to respond to all of the journalists’ questions.
Close-up: Ambassador’s speech to Moscow State University School of Journalism
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On December 17, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Alexander 
Vershbow gave a speech titled “The new U.S.-Russian relationship and the role of the 
independent media,” to the Moscow State University School of Journalism. Although his 
speech was fairly typical of the ambassador’s public presentations, it was an interesting 
example of the strategy behind public diplomacy, and what actually happens at Press 
Section events. The decision that the ambassador needed to give a speech at the Moscow 
State University School of Journalism was purely strategic, when you consider the many 
places and groups he is invited to speak in front of everyday. The speech reflected many 
aspects of the strategy behind America’s public diplomacy including it targeted a specific 
group, it reflected the USG position, and it attempted to show the common ground 
between Russia and the U.S. where mutual understanding can occur. The ambassador’s 
speech targeted a very specific portion of the Russian population, including future social 
and media elites. Moscow State University is the most prestigious school in Russia and 
the School of Journalism trains the next generation of Russian writers and editors.
Making Russia’s future journalists sympathetic to the United States could greatly help the 
USG in the future. The ambassador’s speech also was an avenue where the USG could 
voice its position without directly opposing the actions of the Russian federal 
government. In the few months preceding this speech, the Kremlin had closed down 
some independent television stations and newspapers. The USG has been trying to 
encourage a free press in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union and Russian 
government actions that hindering independent media were not supported by the USG. 
Confronting President Putin over free press in the traditional diplomacy realm would 
have caused tension between the two governments, so the USG chose to voice its opinion
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indirectly through the ambassador’s speech where he condemned limiting the freedom of 
the press. The ambassador’s speech also stressed the key public diplomacy concept of 
mutual understanding as he tried to liken government to press, because both served the 
people. Encouraging foreign populations to relate to the USG will ideally make them 
more sympathetic to the United States and its people.
Despite the ample strategy behind the ambassador’s speech on December 17'^, 
what matters is what really happens in the room and how much the ambassador is 
actually able to influence the audience. The ambassador’s speech was mainly about the 
role of journalism in the modern world and the ever-changing relationship between 
Russia and the United States. There were over 200 Russian students in the audience and 
four major television stations reporting on the speech. The ambassador read most of the 
speech off of notes so it was not the most dynamic speech that I saw him give. After he 
talked for over an hour, there was a question and answer period. I was shocked by how 
loud the students were during the speech as they fervently worked on potential questions 
to ask the ambassador instead of on what he was saying. It did not appear like many of 
the students were actually listening as they talked with their friends and neighbors 
throughout the speech. The students questions for the ambassador ranged from “What is 
your opinion of President Putin?” to “If roles were reversed, and Russia withdrew from 
the ABM Treaty what would the U.S. do?” to “Why was my visa denied?” Despite the 
fact that there was a translator for the Russian students who did not know English, the 
only time the students were very attentive to the ambassador was when he spoke Russian. 
Overall, it is difficult to measure how influential the ambassador was on the journalism 
students although judging by their lack of attentiveness, it would seem he was not as
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influential as public diplomacy strategy would have predicted. One of the plaguing 
problems of the study and improvement of public diplomacy is that while it is clear the 
ways governments try to influence foreign populations, it is nearly impossible to measure 
and quantify how influential those ways really are.
Impressions of the Press Section
From my experience working for the Press Section and my time shadowing their 
activities I developed many impressions of this aspect of America’s public diplomacy. 
One of my first impressions was that they seemed very reactive instead of proactive in 
their relations with the Russian media. Before arriving at the embassy, I had expected the 
Press Section to hold weekly press conferences with the Russian media to explain the 
week’s news from the embassy and to answer questions, similar to the regular briefings 
held by the Department of State and Defense in Washington D.C. I asked Foreign Service 
Officers in the Press Section about this and they responded that the approach with the 
media is at the complete discretion of the current Press Attach^. Prior Press Attaches had 
indeed been more proactive with the Russian press but the current Press Attache was 
choosing because of his personality to be more reactive. Being an outsider to public 
diplomacy, it seems to me that being proactive would be a better position to take so that 
you would effectively shape what was happening, instead of merely reacting to Russian 
press reports. This discrepancy between being a proactive or reactive Press Attache 
provided the lesson that America’s public diplomacy could vary greatly in approach at 
each embassy because the discretion is given to local officers and is not all mandated by 
Mainstate. Of all three of the sections of PAS Moscow, the Press Section seemed the 
least people oriented and access friendly which is ironic considering that its mission is to
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communicate with foreign publics. Like the Cultural Section programs, the Press 
activities are all strategically targeted at specific elements of the foreign population, 
revealing a main characteristic of American public diplomacy. Instead of targeting 
leaders in many different professions like the exchange programs do, the press activities 
target Russian government officials, influential media elites and sometimes the general 
Russian public. American public diplomacy is very calculated, deliberate and strategic in 
nature, all of the programs and activities have intentional audiences and clear missions. 1 
was surprised by the thoroughness in which the Press Section monitored the local print 
and electronic media. I hadn’t imagined that they would employ the personnel to read and 
listen to most of the major papers and stations in an effort of analyzing Russian public 
opinion. It was interesting working at the embassy during the initial stages of the War on 
Terrorism because I could watch the Press Section hone in on Russian opposition to U.S. 
foreign policy actions and the subsequent reactions of Russian Muslim leaders. 
INFORMATION RESOURCE CENTER
The Information Resource Center (IRC) of PAS Moscow is the smallest section of 
the three employing only one American officer and three Foreign Service Nationals yet it 
has a very important role in the mission of public diplomacy. The Information Resource 
Center exists to provide accurate, timely information about any aspect of the United 
States directly to whoever inquires in the host country. In many countries around the 
world it is difficult to find truthful information and statistics about America so the IRC 
exists to make that task easier and information assessable. If a Russian journalist has a 
question about a statistic relating to American society, she can contact the Information 
Resource Center (IRC) and get the answer quickly. If Russian students or NGO’s are
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looking for information about a particular aspect of the United States, they can contact 
the IRC and be given resources. For many years the IRC of Moscow operated a public 
library with certain hours where the Russian public could go and get the answers to their 
questions yet in the past few years, PAS Moscow has found it more efficient to manage a 
electronic information databases where Russians can contact the IRC through the phone 
and email and get accurate information quickly. While many U.S. embassies around the 
world still operate IRC’s that are open to the public, the Information Resource Center in 
Moscow in addition to their closed electronic IRC, has created a new idea of operating 
public access libraries across their host country called American Centers and American 
Corners. Although the American Centers and Corners are a uniquely PAS Moscow idea, 
the IRC uses the same International Information Programs materials and sources that all 
IRC’s use around the world. Because most of the activities of the IRC focus on providing 
information and not coordinating programs like other sections in the PAS, it is logical to 
examine close-up the American Centers and Corners as an example of the IRC 
conducting public diplomacy.
Close-up: American Centers and Corners- Homeland Security’ Speech
American Centers are large libraries that have a circulating collection of books 
about various aspects of the United States, current magazines and periodicals, public 
access computers with printers, CD-ROMS and internet access. American Corners are 
smaller, more compact versions of the Centers which focus on electronic databases and 
computer access. The first American Center opened in 1993 and the first American 
Corner in 1998. There are already five American Centers in the largest Russian cities and 
seventeen American Corners across the country with plans to build many more in the
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next few years. American Centers and Corners are started with based funding by PAS 
Moscow and they are housed in Russian public libraries across the country. The public 
library has to provide the office space and the staff to support the center or corner. The 
director at each center is allowed to choose the activities of the center and most centers 
have weekly English discussion groups, screening of American movies, exhibits on 
American society, American visitors speakers and celebrations of U.S. holidays.
American Centers and Corners provide a place where people can congregate who are 
interested in learning more about the United States, getting on the internet or meeting 
alumni of other USG programs.
The American Center is Moscow is the hub of many weekly activities for 
Russians who are interested in learning about the United States including a Monday night 
guest lecturer presentation. I attended a speech in October by an American Foreign 
Service Officer in the Political Section on Homeland Security. His speech was a dynamic 
example of typical public diplomacy programs because it involved a current American 
government issue, it represented his personal viewpoint as an American citizen instead of 
the view of the USG, and it directly explained American politics to the Russian people 
without the intervention of their government. His speech covered the Homeland Security 
Act and the new Cabinet position, and reasons why the government would want to 
reshuffle its organization. References to the War on Terrorism were rampant throughout 
the presentation, showing how easily current government activities can infiltrate existing 
PAS programs. The speaker stressed him viewpoints to the audience and explained that 
not all Americans hold the same opinions as he does. Representing the diversity of 
American opinions is one of the main goals of improving mutual understanding. This
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presentation also is clearly an example of Americans talking to and with Russians 
directly without the involvement of their governments. There were about forty Russians 
at the lecture and after the Foreign Service officer finished speaking for an hour there was 
a lively question and answer session. The audience was full of questions for the speaker 
but they seemed the most interested in what were the motives of the terrorists, reasons for 
the U.S. reaction and what countries were possible future U.S. targets. Some members of 
the audience seemed stuck on the possibility of the U.S. bombing Iraq. This presentation 
was a very successful public diplomacy program as it encouraged thoughtful dialogue 
between Americans and Russians, and exposed Russians to the internal political debates 
that the U.S. was currently struggling with.
Impressions of the Information Resource Center
I was first exposed to the American Centers during my second day on the job 
when the Cultural Attache, sent me to visit the American Center in Moscow because he 
thought it would help me understand what PAS was doing. I did not understand until I 
visited the Moscow American Center why PAS would fund libraries and how it related to 
public diplomacy. The idea of creating libraries that were full of information specifically 
on the U.S. seemed like blatant propaganda to me but upon visiting the Center multiple 
times, it was apparent how popular they were and the wide-audience that was using them, 
even if they were propaganda. American public diplomacy is fundamentally about 
providing information and in countries such as Russia where the media has been 
controlled for generations, information is a resource that has been chronically under­
funded and ignored. Public Access libraries such as the American Centers and Corners 
are attempts by the USG to fill that information bubble and provide accurate information
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about the United States to people who are interested. The IRC appeared easily accessible 
for Russians with questions and it seemed to be the section with the clearest return for the 
money it was spending. Of all of the programs that I observed during my internship, the 
American Centers impressed me the most because Russians who were interested could go 
learn about whatever they wanted about America and they could meet other Russians 
with similar interests.
Conclusion
After an examination of the definition, history, organization and programs that 
constitute the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, the original question remains; what is 
America’s public diplomacy? It is the Fulbright scholar from Ghana who is studying in 
the United States; it is the USG sponsored trip to America that Margaret Thatcher and 
Kofi Annan took when they were young aspiring leaders; it is the library packed with 
application materials for U.S. universities and colleges that is constantly brimming full of 
Russian high school students in Moscow; it is the weekly English discussion groups at 
U.S. consulates around China; it is jazz night on the Voice of America playing around the 
world; it is free internet access to the public in Siberia. More than any other aspect of 
public diplomacy, it is defined by the programs and people that it touches every day, 
across every culture, around the world. Although the September 11‘^ attacks are what 
brought public diplomacy back into the national spotlight, I have come to believe that all 
though not well known- America’s real public diplomacy occurs not in the limelight of 
wartime, but on a daily basis in the normal activities and programs of Public Affairs 
Sections around the world. I focused in this report on some of the regular programs of 
Moscow PAS because that is the real American public diplomacy that students of
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international politics and the American public do not know about. I was fortunate to have 
the opportunity to witness America’s real public diplomacy as I worked and participated 
in the activities of the Moscow Public Affairs Section. I could have read every book or 
article ever written about public diplomacy and still not have understood what it was 
really about until I talked with a Russian businessman whose trip to the U.S. ten years 
earlier had changed his life, and until I answered questions from inquisitive Russians 
about the state of American moral after the terrorists attacks. America’s public diplomacy 
is fundamentally about people, and programs that connect people around the world to the 
United States with the goal of increasing mutual understanding.
Although public diplomacy as a tool of American foreign policy has taken a great 
deal of condemnation and reduction in funding in the past ten years, the events of 
September 11'^ have made the importance of American public diplomacy clear once 
again. In the months following the terrorists’ attacks on the U.S., there were calls within 
the government and across the nation for more money to be poured into our public 
diplomacy efforts in Central Asia and Muslim dominated countries. September 11**' and 
the subsequent War on Terrorism clearly brought public diplomacy back into the public 
arena for scrutiny and answers, but what did all of the attention tell us about our public 
diplomacy apparatus? The two hearings that the House International Relations 
Committee held during the fall of 2001, concluded that the terrorist attacks were a wake 
up call that America needed to re-examine its public diplomacy apparatus, not only the 
programs and the structure, but the purpose and mission behind them (U.S. Congress 
2001). They suggested that America could no longer neglect this aspect of foreign policy 
and we need to review and possibly change the current structure to prepare adequately for
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the twenty-first century (U.S. Congress 2001). The terrorist attacks opened America’s 
eyes to the contingent of the world’s population that is fervently anti-American, and it 
became apparent that regardless of who is to blame for their views, that hatred is clearly 
now our problem. How foreign publics view the United States no longer only affects 
America’s business interests abroad and our official traditional diplomacy efforts, but it 
clearly can threaten the lives of Americans in America.
Since September 11'*’, America needs to ask the hard questions about our public 
diplomacy apparatus. Is the message we are trying to send the one that is being received? 
Are we listening or merely talking at foreign populations? Is our public diplomacy 
apparatus updated from the Cold War so it can face the unknown challenges of this 
century? Is America’s public diplomacy working? Asking the hard questions, and acting 
on the answers is essential to making America’s public diplomacy apparatus effective in 
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